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INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001
shocked and terrified the world.I Around the world, nations rushed to
share their support and sympathies for the United States.2 Many

1. See Bush Calls TerrorStrikes "Act of War " as Rescuers Comb Debrisfroln
Blitz, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 12, 2001 (discussing the swift response of
NATO to the tragedies), available at 2001 WL 25011152; Marina Jimenez & Carl
Honore, Disbelief Turns to Futy Around the Globe: Britain, Russia Send Messages
of Support to United States, NAT'L POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at A6, available at 2001
WL 27079767 (explaining the reactions of world leaders moving from shock to
resolve to fight terrorism and stand by the United States); Carol J. Williams, World
Leaders Condemn 'New Evil' Response: Allies Rush to Boost Security as
Embassies, Military Post and Banks Go On Htigh Alert, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12,
2001, at A13 (describing the various reactions of world leaders as they increased
security in their own countries and announced their sympathies to the United
States), available at 2001 WL 2517576; Worldwide reaction to attacks on the
United States (NPR: Morning Edition, Sept. 12, 2001) (reporting the responses of'
world leaders to the attacks on the United States and noting the convening of
emergency meetings to discuss security), availableat 2001 WL 9328832.
2. See Reyko Huang & Dr. Michael Donovan, Terrorism Project: The World
Responds (Nov. 6, 2001) (stating the reactions of countries around the world to the
attacks on the United States), at http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/world-responds.cfm
(last visited July 2, 2002). The report contains a of list countries that pledged
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countries, in addition to the United States, moved swiftly to evaluate
their own security measures and to create new laws cracking down
on terrorism.'
After issuing the first and strongest declaration of supporting the
United States and condemning terrorism,' the United Kingdom
responded domestically with a new law to assist the government in
combating acts of terror.5 The United Kingdom's Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001 ("Anti-terrorism Act" or the "Act") 6
curtails certain civil liberties for a particular group of individualsthose foreign non-nationals suspected of being terrorists.7 As a

support to the United States in various ways, including military, intelligence, or
logistical support. See id.
3. See William Hoge, U.S. Terror Attacks Galvanize Europeans to Tighten
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at BI (examining the legislative efforts in the
European Union, France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom to enhance
their laws to protect against terrorism).
4. See Full Text of Tony Blair's Speech, Made Today from Downing Street
[hereinafter Tony Blair'sSpeech] (declaring that the United Kingdom will stand by
the United States and will support America in its efforts to eliminate international
terrorism),
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/wtccrash/story/0, 1300,550655,00.html (last visited July
3, 2002); Williams, supra note 1 (reporting Blair's classification of mass terrorism
as the world's new evil, which the United Kingdom will help to eradicate).

5. See Christopher Cooper & Marc Champion, Britain Seeks More Power to
Jail Terrorism Suspects, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2001, at A18 (announcing the
introduction of the emergency anti-terrorism package in Parliament that allows for
indefinite imprisonment of suspected international terrorists), available at 2001
WL-WSJ 29677886; New Anti-terrorist Measures Announced b.,the Home
Secretaiy (Oct. 3, 2001) (stating the objectives of the new anti-terrorism legislation
proposed
by
the
Home
Secretary),
at
http://www.pm.gov.uk/news.asp?Newsld=2676 (last visited July 3, 2002).
6. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24, §§ 21-23 (Eng.)
(detailing the new law of the United Kingdom for dealing with suspected
international terrorists, through certification, deportation, and detention), available
at http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm (last visited
July 3, 2002).
7. See Brian Groom, et al., In Liberty's Name - The Sweeping Powers that
Britain and the US Want to Assume to Counteract Terrorism Are Raising Fears
that FundamentalFreedoms Will Be Lost, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 21, 2001,
(noting that although the U.K.'s bill was not as detrimental to civil liberties as the
proposed U.S. measures, controversy and debate surrounded the Anti-terrorism Act
for its impact on fundamental rights), available at 2001 WL 30141289.
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member of the Council of Europe 8 and one of the original contracting
parties to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms 9 ("Convention" or "Human Rights
Convention"), the United Kingdom made a commitment to the
protection of basic human rights and democratic principles." '
Because parts of the Anti-terrorism Act directly violate Article 5(l)
of the Convention, the United Kingdom declared a state of'
emergency to temporarily opt out of its obligations under that part of'
the Convention." The United Kingdom is the only member country
forced to derogate from the Human Rights Convention because of'
the implementation of a new anti-terrorism law.' 2
By December 19, 2001, within days of becoming law, 3 the
government had already used its new powers under the Antiterrorism Act to detain suspected international terrorists." After the
8. See The Council of Europe's Member States (listing the member countries
of
the
Council
of
Europe),
avaialble
at
http://
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Communication-andResearch/Contactswiththepiblic/
AboutCouncil of Europe/CoEMap_&_Members/ (last visited July 7, 2002).
9. See Brice Dickson, The Council of Europe and the European Convention
on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 6 (Brice
Dickson ed., 1997) (noting that the United Kingdom was the first country to ratify
the European Convention on March 8, 195 1).
10. See id. at 1-2 (listing the primary aims of the Council of Europe).
11. See Cooper & Champion, supra note 5 (stating that the detention section of
the Anti-terrorism bill would violate Article 5 of the European Convention oil
Human Rights).
12. See Hoge, supra note 3, at BI (providing an overview of the new laws
proposed in France, Germany, and Spain in response to the terrorist attacks in the
United States on September 11, 2001).
13. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill Receives Royal Assent, M2
PRESSWIRE, Dec. 17, 2001 (announcing the passage of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime
and Security Act as a means to combat terrorism in the United Kingdom),
available at 2001 WL 30052509; see also Ed Johnson, Britain s Anti-terror Law
Passes, AP ONLINE, Dec. 13, 2001 (discussing the passage of the bill early Friday
after days of debate), available at 2001 WL 31685820.
14. See Phillip Johnston, Terror Suspects Rounded Up, DAILY TELFGRAI'II
(LONDON), Dec. 20, 2001, at P2 (reporting Immigration officers and police raiding
homes in England under the authority of the Anti-terrorism Act), available at 2001
WL 31846724; see also Paul Waugh, Campaign Against Terrorism: Terror
Suspects to be Rounded Up Under New Law, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Dec.
15, 2001, at 14 (discussing the authority that the Anti-terrorism Act gives to the
immigration officers to begin arresting those on a list of suspects prepared by
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arrests of eight individuals, civil libertarian groups announced that
they planned to challenge the law both in the British courts and the
European Court of Human Rights ("Court of Human Rights" or "the
Court") 1 The civil libertarians claim that the British government
lacks a valid justification for the state of emergency it declared to
suspend its obligations under the Human Rights Convention. '6
This Comment argues that the United Kingdom correctly
concluded that it faces a public emergency within the meaning of
Article 15 of the Convention and has only taken those steps required
by the circumstances of global terrorism to protect the nation. Part I
discusses the Anti-terrorism Act and the emergency powers that it
confers upon the British government. 7 The background of the
Human Rights Convention and the details of Articles 5 and 15 are
also discussed, as well as the authority of the Court of Human Rights
to render a decision concerning the appropriateness of the United
Kingdom's derogation from the Convention. Part II examines how
the Court should rule on the existence of a public emergency in the
United Kingdom and the extent to which the Anti-terrorism Act's

intelligence services), available at 2001 WL 31602573. In addition to the Antiterrorism Act, police are using the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Immigration Act
1971 in an effort to clamp down on European terrorism. See More Held in UK
Terror
Probe
(Jan.
18,
2002),
at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLDIEurope/01/18/inv/Britain/index.html
(last
visited July 3, 2002).
15. See Frances Gibb, Civil Liberties Lauers to Challenge Detentions, TIMES
(LONDON), Dec. 20, 2001, at 4 (noting that civil liberties lawyers had been waiting
for the opportunity to challenge the Anti-terrorism Act), available at 2001 WL
29013421.
16. See id. (stating the belief of John Wadham, director of the civil liberties
group Liberty, that the arrests destroy the basic principles of human rights of
British law and the European Convention on Human Rights); see also Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as amended by
Protocol No. 11), Nov. 4, 1950 [hereinafter Convention] (stating that pursuant to
Article 15(1), a member country may temporarily opt out of the Convention under
certain
circumstances),
available
at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/HtmU005.htm (last visited July 7,
2002).
17. See infi-a notes 20-54 and accompanying text (introducing the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 and the European Convention on
Human Rights).
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detention powers are required by that emergency. 8 Part III argues
that the United Kingdom must actively review both the need tbr the
detention powers and the entire Anti-terrorism Act in light of'
changing circumstances within its borders. 9 The validity of the
derogation from the Convention hinges on the existence of a public
emergency and an actual need for the measures taken. The United
Kingdom must ensure that the detention powers remain a temporary
measure and that they are repealed or allowed to expire when no
longer necessary.

I. BACKGROUND: THE ACT AND THE
CONVENTION
A. STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND
SECURITY ACT 2001
The Anti-terrorism Act increases the British government's power
to prevent international terrorists and suspected internationl terrorists
from abusing the asylum and immigration laws of the United
Kingdom.20 Since the 1970s, the United Kingdom has repeatedly
denied extradition requests from countries that use the death penalty,
leading to the criticism that Britain is a haven for many political
refugees suspected of terrorism. 2' Sections 21 through 23 of the Anti18. See infra notes 55-130 and accompanying text (analyzing the precedent of'
Lawless v. Ireland and its application to the Anti-terrorism Act).
19. See infra notes 131-163 and accompanying text (recommending that the

United Kingdom remain cautious in its restriction of civil liberties).
20. See UK's Blunkett Says Anti-Terrorist Bill Has 'Proportionate,Targcted
Measures,' AFX (UK), Nov. 13, 2001 (declaring that the purpose of the Anti-

terrorism bill is, among other things, "to prevent terrorists abusing immigration
and asylum laws"), available at 2001 WL 28041638; see also Britons Shocked by

Ter-or Links (mentioning the use of the United Kingdom as a haven for people
fleeing
other
governments),
at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/Europe/0 1/18/inv.Britain.terror/i ndex. htmI
(last visited July 3, 2002).

21. See Cooper & Champion, supra note 5 (reporting that the United Kingdom
has routinely ignored Egypt's requests for extradition, because the United
Kingdom dislikes Egypt's death penalty and justice system); see also Investigating
Terror Places: London [hereinafter Investigating Terror Places] (stating that

countries have criticized the United Kingdom for becoming a haven for suspected
international

terrorists),

at
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terrorism Act allow the government to take action against foreign
non-nationals whom the Secretary of State for the Home Department
("Secretary of State") suspects of terrorist activity. 2 Under section
23, "a suspected international terrorist may be detained ...despite
the fact that his removal or departure from the United Kingdom is
prevented" by international law. 23 Prior to the enactment of this
section of the Anti-terrorism Act, the United Kingdom had only three
options for dealing with suspected international terrorists: (1) deport
them to a safe country; (2) prosecute them under existing U.K. law;
or (3) let them go free.24 Section 23 gives the government a fourth
option, detention to prevent the suspected terrorist from taking part
in any future activities that may be harmful to the United Kingdom."
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/indepthlworld/200Ilwar on terror/investig
ationonterror/places_7.stm (last visited July 3, 2002).
22. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, §§ 21-23 (stating the
Secretary of State has the authority to issue a certificate to suspected international
terrorists allowing for the deportation or detention of the certified individuals). A
person can be certified as a suspected international terrorist if 'the Secretary of
State reasonably (a) believes that the person's presence in the United Kingdom is a
risk to national security, and (b) suspects that the person is a terrorist." i. §
21(1)(a)-(b). The Act defines terrorism through the definition used in the Terrorism
Act 2000. Id. § 21(5). Terrorism is "the use or threat of action where... (b) the
use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or
a section of the public, and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of
advancing a political, religious or ideological cause." Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, §
1(1) (Eng.), http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/2000001 .htm (last
visited July 3, 2002). In addition, section 1(2) of the Terrorism Act requires that
the action, either
(a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to
property, (c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person
committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the
public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with
or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
Id. § 1(2).
23. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, § 23 (defining the
government's power to detain those certified as suspected international terrorists
even though the suspect may not be removed from the country because of
international agreement or practical considerations).
24. See Blunkett's Bill: A Necessary Measure To Deit " Terrorists a Haven in
Britain, TIMES (LONDON),Nov. 20, 2001, at 17 (on file with author) (discussing
the need for a fourth option for dealing with those suspected of international
terrorism).
25. See id. (asserting that detention of suspected international terrorists will
protect not only Great Britain, but Western democracy as well).
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The detention of a non-national without the intention or authority
to deport him violates Article 5(l)() of the Human Rights
Convention, 26 because the Convention only permits detention of nonnationals if deportation proceedings are in progress. 27 In order to
prevent this violation, the United Kingdom declared a state of
emergency to temporarily suspend its obligations under the
Convention as permitted under Article 15 of the Human Rights
Convention. 8
B. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Adopted in 1950, in part to avoid the reoccurrence of the human
rights atrocities of the Second World War, the Human Rights
Convention obligates the member countries to "secure the rights and
freedoms" of the Convention to everyone within their jurisdictions."z
The Convention expresses the idea that promoting individual rights
and freedoms above those of the state will best protect democracy."'
Called "the most advanced international system for protecting human
rights in existence today,"'" the Human Rights Convention has a
significant impact on the lives of the residents of Europe.32
26. See Convention, supra note 16, art. 5(I)(f) (stating "[N]o one shall be

deprived of his liberty save in... the lawful arrest or detention of a person to
prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against
whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition"); see also
Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, 465
(1997) (holding that the requirements of Article 5(l)(0 are met when "action is
being taken with a view to deportation").
27. See Chahal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 465 (stating that if deportation
proceedings are not in progress or are not prosecuted with due diligence, the
detention of a non-national violates Article 5(l)(f)).
28. See Convention, supra note 16, art. 15 (allowing for a Contracting party to
"take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention" in times of
public emergency).
29. See id art. I (defining the obligations of the members to the Human Rights
Convention).
30. See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE:
BRITAIN

AND

THE

GENESIS

OF THE

EUROPEAN

CONVENTION

157 (2001)

(concluding that of the two theories discussed in Europe during and following
World War II to preserve peace and democracy, the Convention favored the theory
of individual rights over the alternative theory of economic and social justice).
3 1. See Elizabeth A. Faulkner, The Right to Habeas Corpus: Only in the Other
Americas, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 653, 675 (1994) (discussing the well-
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1. Article 5(1)-The Right to Liberty and Security
Article 5 of the Convention protects against unwarranted state
intrusions upon the liberty and security of individuals by prohibiting
unjustified detentions.33 Article 5(1) provides that "[e]veryone has
the right to liberty and security of person."3 4 Establishing the test for
the lawfulness of a detention, Article 5(1) defines the six situations in
which a state may detain a person, none of which allow for the kind
of detentions used in the Anti-terrorism Act." The Convention
allows states to protect the rights of the public, 3 6 but specifies that

members' actions must not exceed the limits of the rule of law
established by the Convention.37 Member countries believe so
strongly in the idea that individuals should be free from unwarranted
state intrusions that a person has the right to compensation if a

established judicial system to protect the rights guaranteed in the Human Rights
Convention).
32. See Dickson, supra note 9, at 6 (remarking that of all the actions of the
Council of Europe, many of which were instrumental in changing the lives of
European residents, the Human Rights Convention has had the greatest influence).
33. See J.L. MURDOCH, ARTICLE 5 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE PROTECTION OF LIBERTY AND SECURITY OF PERSON 7 (1994)

(explaining the general purpose for Article 5 of the Convention).
34. See Convention, supra note 16, art. 5(l) (declaring that every individual
has a right to liberty and property).
35. See id. art. 5(1)(a)-(f) (announcing the limited circumstances in which a
detention may occur); MURDOCH, supra note 33, at 7 (stating that the six
exceptions listed in Article 5(1) provide the test for legality of detention).
36. See MURDOCH, supra note 33, at 10 (accepting that the Court allows
member states to consider the public interest when making determinations
regarding the validity of a detention under Article 5 of the Convention); see also
KEIR STARMER, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF

1998 AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGIITS 108 (1999) (noting
that the reason for the six exceptions to the protection of liberty and security are to
allow states to protect the public).
37. See MURDOCH, supra note 33, at 10-11 (indicating that the Court
understands that certain problems such as organized crime and terrorism present
particularly "delicate issues" for member states, requiring states to balance the
interests of the public with the protection of individual rights); see also infra notes
48-54 and accompanying text (containing material on the margin of appreciation
and discussing the Court's deference to the decision made by a member state for
the protection of its citizens).
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member state deprives him of his liberty and security in violation of
Article 5.38
2. Article 15-Derogationfron the Convention
Although the member countries consider the rights and freedoms
detailed in the Convention to be fundamental to democracy, 9 the
Convention contains a public emergency exception.40 The exception

states, "[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the
life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures
derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation."'" While states
may not derogate from the entire Convention,4 2 Article 15 allows
member countries to derogate from the provisions of Article 5.4 -

38. See Convention, supra note 16, art. 5(5) ("Everyone who has been the
victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this article shall
have an enforceable right to compensation."); see also MURDOCH, supra note 33,
at 53-54 (explaining that Article 5(5)'s right to compensation is a domestic
remedy). Domestic courts of the offending country must provide compensation for
a violation of Article 5. See id. at 53. Article 5(5) requires countries to make this
compensation to victims of violations of Article 5 even if the Convention has not
been incorporated into the domestic law of the country. See id. Article 41 of the
Convention allows the Court of Human Rights to order "just satisfaction" if the
domestic law of the country involved only provides for partial reparations. Sec
Convention, supra note 16, art. 41.
39. See D.J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 2 (1995) (specifying that the Convention was meant to function as an
alarm against the violation and suppression of human rights in Western Europe).
40. See Convention, supra note 16, art. 15 (allowing any member to
temporarily opt out of certain obligations under the Convention because of war or
other public emergency).
41. See id. art. 15(1) (articulating the requirements that must be met for a
member country to properly derogate from its responsibilities and obligations
under the Convention).
42. See id. art. 15(2) ("No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of
deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph I) and 7
shall be made under this provision.").
43. See id. art. 15(2) (listing the specific articles of the Convention from which
no derogation may be made); see also Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. 1-l.R.
Rep. 25, 91 (1978) (finding that because Article 5 is not expressly mentioned in
Article 15(2), it is therefore "subject to the 'right of derogation' reserved by the
Contracting States").
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3. JurisdictionOver Derogation

Article 15 of the Convention requires that the member country
must notify the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of its
derogation from the Convention and the reasons for the derogation.'
Under the Convention, either an individual or a member country may
challenge the derogation of a member country at the Court of Human
Rights.45 A petitioner must first exhaust all reasonable domestic
remedies before the Court will declare a matter admissible.46 The
Court has the jurisdiction to decide if the challenged country made a
proper derogation under Article 15."

44. See Convention, supra note 16, art. 15(3). Article 15(3) states that:
Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall
keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the
measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased
to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully
executed.

Id.
45. See Convention, supra note 16, art. 34.
The Court may receive applications from any person.. .or group of
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols
thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the
effective exercise of this right.
Id. Previously, individuals could not petition directly to the European Court of
Human Rights. Instead, individuals petitioned the European Commission on
Human Rights ("the Commission"). See Faulkner, supra note 31, at 676. The
Commission could then decide to refer the case to the Court. See id. This process
created a backlog of cases, resulting in the enactment of Protocol II to the
Convention in 1998. Protocol 11 replaced the Commission and the Court with a
single Court to which individuals may petition directly. See STARMER, supra note
36, at 697 (1999).
46. See Convention, supra note 16, art. 35(1) (stating that the Court may only
deal with a matter once "all domestic remedies have been exhausted," and that the
petitioner must bring the matter to the Court's attention within six months of the
final domestic decision); see also STARMER, supra note 36, at 707 (clarifying that
the petitioner must only exhaust domestic remedies that are likely to be effective).
47. See Convention, supra note 16, art. 32(1) ("The jurisdiction of the Court
shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the
Convention and the protocols thereto"); see also Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 15 (1961) (holding that the Court makes the determination of whether the
condition for derogation under Article 15 have been met).
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4. Margin of Appreciation: The Scope qf the Court of Human Rights'
Review over Article 15
The Court of Human Rights decided that it plays a limited role in

the review of a member country's declaration of a public emergency
under Article 15.48 The Court grants member countries this margin of

appreciation because it recognizes that each member state is
primarily responsible for its own survival and stability.49 A member
country must determine the severity of a threat to the nation and its
people and the scope of the measures necessary to control the
situation. 50 The Court reasoned that because the individual
governmental authorities have continuous and direct contact with the
daily conditions of the state, those authorities are in the best position
to make such a determination."

Member nations, however, do not enjoy absolute deference from
the Court regarding the scope of derogation from their obligations
under the Convention.12 The Court's job is to rule on the lawfulness,
not the wisdom, of the derogation and the measures taken to combat
the emergency. 3 Therefore, the Court maintains the limited role of
ensuring that member states do not abuse the right to derogate by
acting in a manner that the situation does not strictly require. 4

48. See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 91 (conceding that the Court's power of
review is limited when a member country makes a derogation tinder Article 15
because of a public emergency).
49. See id. (placing the responsibility for maintenance of the nation in the
hands of each member state).
50. See id. at 91-92 (stating that each member state should bear the
responsibility for making decisions regarding its security and safety).
51. See id. at 92 (deciding that a member state's authorities are in a better
position than the Court to make determinations regarding the circumstances
affecting that nation).
52. See id. (explaining that the Court grants only a margin of appreciation, not
complete deference to their decision to derogate).
53. See id. at 95 (acknowledging the Court's limited role in merely reviewing
the lawfulness of the measures that the derogating member state has taken).
54. See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep.. at 92 (clarifying that the Court has a
supervisory role in the derogation decisions made by member countries). But see
Oren Gross, "Once More Unto the Breach ": The Systematic Failure of Applyving
the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALF
J.INT'L L.437, 460 (1998) (arguing that the Court of Human Rights gives almost
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II. ANALYSIS: ARTICLE 15(1) & LAWLESS V.
IRELAND
In Lawless v. Ireland," the Court heard the first challenge by an
individual to a country's derogation under Article 15 of the
Convention. 6 In response to acts of violence committed by the Irish
Republican Army ("IRA") beginning in 1921, the Republic of
Ireland's ("Ireland") legislature conferred special powers on the Irish
Government with the Offences Against the State Act 1939
("Offences Act") . 5 7 The Offences Act and its subsequent
amendments allowed the Irish Minister of State to detain individuals
without a trial if the Irish Government declared such powers
necessary to secure public peace and order." Because a trial did not
accompany this detention, Ireland derogated from the Human Rights
Convention in 1957 when it invoked the special powers under the
Offences Act. 9

complete deference to member countries, rarely disagreeing with a country's
decision to declare a public emergency or with measures taken in response to the
emergency).
55. 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (1961).
56. See BRIAN DOOLAN, LAWLESS V. IRELAND (1957-1961): TIE FIRST CASE
BEFORE

THE

EUROPEAN

COURT

OF

HUMAN

RIGHTS,

MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE? 154 (2001) (labeling the

AN

INTERNATIONAL

Lawless case a "legal history"

because it was the first complaint by an individual where the Court decided the
merits); see also Dickson, Northern Ireland and the European Convention, supra
note 9, at 144 (noting that Lawless was the European Court of Human Rights' first
decision).
57. See Lawless, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 17 (stating the need for extraordinary
powers following the commencement of IRA violence aimed at ending British
control over Northern Ireland).
58. See id. at 17 (describing the process allowing the Minister of State to use
the powers conferred on him by the Offences Against the State Act 1939 and the
Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1940). To arrest the individual, the
Minister of State had to believe that the person was engaged in activities contrary
to the preservation of public peace or the security of the state. Id. at 18. The
individual would be detained in prison until he met certain conditions for release or
until the Offences Act was repealed. Id.
59. See id. at 31 (stating that the Irish Government notified the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe that Ireland intended to derogate from the
Convention to preserve public peace and order).
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The Irish Minister of Justice detained G. R. Lawless under the
Offences Act. 60 After an unsuccessful challenge through the Irish

court system, Lawless challenged both Ireland's detention law and its
derogation before the European Court of Human Rights.6 '
After addressing the other violations of the Convention alleged by
Lawless, the Court turned its attention to the issue of derogation and
the meaning of Article 15(1).62 The Court declared that it had the
authority to "determine whether the conditions laid down in Article
15(1) for the exercise of the exceptional right of derogation [had]
been fulfilled in the present case. '63 Because Article 15(1) has two
parts, the Court first considered the "existence of a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation," and then examined the
"measure[s] taken [by Ireland] in derogation from obligations Linder
64
the Convention."
A. PUBLIC EMERGENCY THREATENING THE LIFE OF THE NATION
Using the customary and natural meaning of the words, the
Lawless Court established that public emergency means "an
exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole
population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the
community of which the State is composed. '65 The Court examined

60. See id. at 20 (introducing the facts of Lawless's arrest and detention in
1957).
61. See Lawless, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 20-21 (chronicling Lawless' attempts
before the Irish courts and his claims before the European Commission on Human
Rights). Following the opinion of the Commission, Lawless was permitted to
appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. Id. at 17. By this time, Lawless
had been released, but he continued the proceedings in hopes of winning
compensation, damages, and reimbursement of costs. Id. at 20.
62. See id. at 30 (examining the text of Article 15 of the Convention and the
situation in Ireland at the time of the derogation).
63. Id. (establishing the Court's jurisdiction, as stated in Article 32 of the
Convention); see Convention, supra note 16, art. 32 (stating that the Court has
jurisdiction over all matters concerning the application of the Convention).
64. See Lawless, I Eur. H.R. Rep. at 31, 32 (articulating the requirements of

Article 15 that the Court uses to determine if a member country has made a valid
derogation).
65. See id. at 31 (defining the terms by which the Court would judge Ireland's
derogation); see also DOOLAN, supra note 56, at 251 (concluding that the major
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the facts and circumstances surrounding the government's derogation
to ensure that the derogation fell within this conception of public
emergency.66
In Lawless, the Court relied on several key facts in reaching its
conclusion that Ireland faced a public emergency including: the
secret nature of the IRA's unconstitutional behavior and violence;
the operations of the IRA outside of Ireland potentially jeopardizing
relations with other countries; the steady increase in the levels of
violence used by the IRA; and the failed attempts to control the
situation using ordinary legislation and criminal procedure." From
these factors, the Court held that Ireland reasonably believed it faced
a public emergency, thus satisfying the first element of Article 15.1
B. APPLICATION OF LA WLESS TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM

In applying the Lawless holding to the current situation in the
United Kingdom, the Court of Human Rights should find that the
United Kingdom has a reasonably justifiable belief that it faces a
"public emergency threatening the life of the nation," thus satisfying
the first element of Article 15(1 ).69 The British government enacted
extraordinary means to deal with the threat of terrorism due to an
increased sense that the United Kingdom is a terrorist target, in part
because of its close relationship with the United States. 7" Although
contribution of the Lawless case was the establishment of a definition of public

emergency for the application of Article 15).
66. See Lawless, I Eur. H.R. Rep. at 31 (explaining the criteria on which the
Court would base the determination of the validity of Ireland's derogation).
67. See id. at 31-32 (noting the combination of factors which allowed the Court
to find that a public emergency existed in Ireland at the time of derogation).

68. See id. at 31 (finding that a public emergency existed).
69. See Convention, supra note 16, art. 15(l) (allowing derogation of a
member country's obligation under the Convention "in time of war or other public

emergency threatening the life of the nation").
70. See Groom, et al., supra note 7 (commenting that the broad anti-terrorism

proposals in the United Kingdom and the United States following the attacks on
September 11, 2001 result from their perceived vulnerability to further attacks);

Tony Blair'sSpeech, supra note 4 (announcing that the attack on America was an
attack on the world and that the United Kingdom would work with the United
States to defeat international terrorism). A long-standing relationship exists
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the focus of the campaign against terrorism since September 11 has
been in Afghanistan, intelligence sources suggest that terrorist cells
are operating and coordinating activities throughout Europe,
including the United Kingdom. 71 As a result, the British government
believes that a public emergency exists requiring the use of
extraordinary measures to detain suspected international terrorists in
order to protect the nation from terrorism.72
1. Evidence of TerroristActivity in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom believes that it is not only a possible target
of international terrorism, 73 but also an organizational base of
terrorist activity.74 A recent study by the International Institute for
between the United States and the United Kingdom. See Thomas K. Grose &
Kenneth T. Walsh, A Statesman, Steadfast and Strong, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 12, 2001 (reporting that President Bush declared Prime Minister Blair is "all
you could want from an ally"), available at 2001 WL 30366126. In addition, bin
Laden has stated that the freedoms and human rights in the United States, and in
the west in general, are doomed. See Bin Laden's sole post-September I1 TV
interview
aired,
CNN
ONLINE,
at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/0 1/3 1/gen.binladen.interview/index.html
(last
visited Feb. 1, 2002). See generally Jeffrey Ian Ross, The Nature of Contemporarl
International Terrorism, in DEMOCRATICE

RESPONSES

TO

INTERNATIONAL

31 (David A. Charters ed., 1991) (discussing that the citizens of the
United Kingdom, along with the France, Israel, Turkey, and the United States,
account for approximately half of the targets of terrorists).
71. See Rod Nordland, et al., Al Qaeda Runs for the Hills, NEWSWEEK, Dec.
17, 2001 (reporting that most of the planning for recent major terrorist attacks,
such as the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Africa and the USS Cole, has largely
taken place outside of Afghanistan), available at 2001 WL 19505648. Evidence
suggests that preparation for the September 11 th attacks originated in lamburg,
Germany. Id. Authorities also believe that the Hamburg cell developed contacts
with other European cells. Id.
72. See UK Debates Terror Arrest Measure (Nov. 19, 2001), CNN ONLINE.
(reporting Home Secretary David Blunkett's statement that to protect the United
Kingdom, he will detain suspected international terrorists since he cannot deport
them),
at
http://wwv.cnncom/200l/WORLD/Europe/I 1/I 9/gen.britain.debate/index.html
(last visited July 2, 2002).
TERRORISM

73. See Groom, et al., supra note 7 (discussing the United Kingdom's belief
that it, too, is a target for international terrorists following the attacks on the United
States).
74. See infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (detailing support for the
United Kingdom's suspicion that it has become a base for terrorist operations).
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Strategic Studies indicates three possible reasons for the United
Kingdom's popularity with terror suspects,75 helping to explain
Britain's label as a terrorist haven.76 First, a large immigrant
community exists in the United Kingdom, allowing non-nationals to
blend in easily.7 7 Instructions from a terrorism operations manual
produced by Osama bin Laden's organization recommend integrating
into society by adopting the style of dress and manner of the host
country.78 The large immigrant community in Great Britain enables
foreign terrorist suspects to go unnoticed with very little effort,7 9
allowing them to maintain the secrecy of their activities.w
The second reason the United Kingdom attracts terrorist suspects
is the population's concern for the protection of civil liberties, which
makes it difficult for law enforcement agencies to investigate and

75. See Britons Shocked by Terror Links, supra note 20 (reporting a study
completed by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, indicating the
reasons why terror suspects choose the United Kingdom as a base for their
activities).
76. See Investigating Terror Places, supra note 21 (explaining that England's
Anti-terrorism Act is, in part, a response to international criticism that the United
Kingdom has become a haven to terrorist suspects). The Court of Human Rights
reasoned that a situation that jeopardizes relations with other countries may present
a partial justification for declaring a public emergency. See Lawless, I Eur. H.R.
Rep. at 31. Recently, Spain and France discovered links between the United
Kingdom and international terrorist groups like al Qaeda. See Jason Burke, Terror
Video Used to Lure UK Muslims: Mosque Recruitnent Film Shows Bin Laden
Slayings,
THE
OBSERVER
(LONDON),
Jan.
27,
2002,
at
http://www.observer.co.uk/uk-news/story/0,6903,640035,00.html (last visited June
30, 2002).
77. See Britons Shocked by Terror Links, supra note 20 (stating that there a
large immigrant community in the United Kingdom).
78. See John Cloud, The Plot Comes Into Focus; A Lowl-Profile, Even Meager
Lifestyle Allowed 19 Hijackers to Blend Into the American Tapestry, TIME, Oct. 1,
2001, at 50 (remarking that the ordinary nature of the terrorist suspects and the
apparent lack of structure in the organization are intentional parts of the operation),
availableat 2001 WL 22575202.
79. See Britons Shocked by Terror Links, supra note 20 (finding the large
immigrant population makes blending in very easy in the United Kingdom).
80. See Lawless, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 31 (relying on the secret nature of the IRA
terrorist activity as part of the basis for finding that a public emergency existed in
Ireland).
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identify suspected activities quickly.8' The debate, both in the public
and the Parliament, surrounding the passage of the Anti-terrorism
Act provides ample proof of the overwhelming resistance to any
2
change in, or limitations on, civil liberties in the United Kingdom.
The third factor indicating the United Kingdom's popularity with
terror suspects concerns the recruiting activities of several mosques."
Evidence of those recruiting activities comes from admissions by
suspected terrorists that experiences at certain London mosques
radicalized them.84 The figurehead of the Finsbury Park mosque, to
which several suspects have connections, openly supports Islamic
81. See Britons Shocked by TerrorLinks, supra note 20 (concluding that liberal
societal concerns for safeguarding civil liberties make it difficult for enforcement
officials to carry out surveillance, allowing terror suspects to engage in planning
activities unobserved).
82. See, e.g., Peter F. Carter-Ruck, Anti-terrorism Bill Will Erode Civil
Liberties, DAILY TEL. (LONDON), Nov. 21, 2001, at 25 (expressing concern over
the injustices that may arise from the detention powers of the Anti-terrorism Act,
leading ultimately toward the erosion of a trial by jury), available at 2001 WL
30371383; Greg Hurst, Blunkett Limits Detention Power, TIMES (LONDON), Nov.
22, 2001, at 12 (discussing concessions required during the committee-stage debate
on the Anti-terrorism Act due to the cross-party criticism of the detention powers):
Johnson, supra note 13 (noting that "a bruising contest" preceded passage of the
Anti-terrorism Act, forcing compromise on the bill); R. J. Overy, Deep Concern
Over Anti-terrorism Bill, TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 28, 2001, at 19 (articulating the
"alarm" felt because of the detention provisions in the Anti-terrorism Act and the
eroding impact it will have on civil liberties); T.R. Reid, Britain Proposes AntiTerrorism Measures, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2001, at A29 (on file with author)
(noting the strong criticism of the civil libertarians to the proposed anti-terrorism
measures); Martin Thomas, The Anti-terrorism Bill Undermines Both the llman
Rights Convention and the Rule of law, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Nov. 26, 2001
(fearing that injustice of the detention powers will feed the terrorists' cause and
undermine the rule of law), available at 2001 WL 30420163; John Wadham,
Innocents Are Going to Be Locked Up: The Terror Bill Is Not Needed and Will
Lead to Human Rights Abuses, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Nov. 21, 2001, at 18
(asserting that the Anti-terrorism Act will follow in the footsteps of other antiterrorism laws and lead to human rights abuses, contribute to miscarriages of
justice, and cause the detention of innocent people), available at 2001 WL
30418102.
83. See Britons Shocked by Terror Links, supra note 20 (believing that the
inciting language the clerics used in these mosques to encourage congregations
seduces some into action).
84. See Investigating Terror Places, supra note 21 (stating that many arrested
in connection with the September II attacks said that their time in London
contributed to radicalizing them).
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extremism." To further support the United Kingdom's fears that it is
a recruiting center for radical Muslims, investigations have
discovered that mosques, including the Finsbury Park mosque, are
distributing recruitment videos produced by bin Laden-backed
organizations.86

Terrorism has become increasingly global and sophisticated,
requiring governments such as the United Kingdom to recognize that
a public emergency exists. 7 German secret service officials estimate
that bin Laden's organization has trained thousands of terrorists, with

85. See id. (reporting the connection between several terrorism suspects and
Finsbury Park mosque, where the Imam is an open supporter of Muslim
extremism).
86. See Burke, supra note 76 (explaining that the recruitment videos, labeled
by security sources as "pornographic catalogue[s] of violence," are sold to raise
funds for the "Islamic cause" and recruit new volunteers).
87. See Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance
Between the Rigth of a Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection of lunian
Rights, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 89, 97 (declaring that terrorism is
now global, operating within a network that exchanges intelligence, tactics,
weapons, and training information and assists with funding); Cloud, supra note 78
(explaining that bin Laden has terrorist cells around the world); see also Roland
Jacquard, The Guidebook of Jihad, TIME, Oct. 29, 2001, at 58 (stating that
European anti-terrorism investigators have obtained evidence through terrorists'
confessions that biological and chemical weapons, as well as active recruitment of
engineers, have become a part of the training camp regime), available at 2001 WL
29385322; see also Nordland, supra note 71 (reporting that the destruction of bin
Laden's base in Afghanistan will have little effect on the tens of thousands whom
bin Laden had already trained and remain at large); see also Edward T. Pound, The
Root of All Evil, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Dec. 3. 2001 (describing the
"formidable" global network of Islamic charities, front companies, legitimate
businesses, and criminal activities established to fund bin Laden's terrorist
network), available at 2001 WL 30366285; see also Randall E. Stross, A Web of
Peace-or War?, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Nov. 26, 2001 (noting that some

evidence suggests that the terrorists behind the attacks on September 11, 2001 used
the internet as a means of coordinating the attacks), available at 2001 WL
30365714. See generally WALTER LACQUEUR, THE NEW TERRORISM, FANATICISM
AND THE ARMS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 59-70 (1999) (examining the current state

of chemical and biological weapons used by terrorists). The United Kingdom is
one of several countries to report that chemical weapons have in fact been used
there, although the amounts were insignificant and did no real harm. Id. at 60.
Biological weapons carry several advantages for terrorists, including ease of
production and difficulty in detection. Id. at 65. The additional benefit of
biological weapons is the panic and terror that they cause because of the possible
widespread effects on humans, animals, crops, and the economy. Id.
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as many as one thousand of them making their way to Europe after
training.88 The ease with which people can communicate makes the
globalization of international terrorism a significant threat to the
security of a nation,8 9 enabling terrorists to plan operations in one
location to be carried out in another, potentially straining
international relations. 90 This information, combined with suspected
international terrorists' attraction to the United Kingdom," the
confirmation of terrorism recruitment activities in the United
Kingdom, 92 and Britain's aversion to deporting foreigners who could
face execution or torture in their home countries,93 gives the United
Kingdom ample reason to conclude it has become a popular location
for terrorists to locate their operations. 94 This, in turn, creates a
88. See Cloud, supra note 78 (indicating the fear of German officials that
Europe is home to many bin Laden terrorist cells); see also Nordland, supra note
71 (citing German federal police reports that as many as 70,000 Muslims from
many different countries have passed through bin Laden's training camps).
89. See Bin Laden's Sole Post-September Il TV Interview Aired, supra note 70
(reporting bin Laden's statement that he does not need to use secret messages to
communicate with his terrorist network because of the existence of the Internet and
email). In addition to using global communication technology to communicate
with each other, terrorists can use it in their operations to increase the size of their
attacks. See Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Rise of Complex Terrorism, (it
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue-janfeb_2002/homer-dixon.html (last visited
June 30, 2002). The expanded use of the Internet, cellular phones and twenty-fourhour news stations allowed people instant and continuous information on the
September 11 terrorist attacks. Id. The global interconnectedness dramatically
amplifies the emotional impact of terrorism by allowing vast numbers of people to
witness the attacks. Id.
90. See Investigating Terror Places, supra note 21 (noting international
criticism directed toward the United Kingdom for becoming a terrorist's haven);
see also Burke, supra note 76 (reporting that France and Spain arrested al-Qaeda
operatives with connections to the United Kingdom).
91. See Britons Shocked by Terror Links, supra note 20 (stating three reasons
why the United Kingdom's attracts suspected international terrorists).
92. See Burke, supra note 76 (explaining that the United Kingdom's
determination that it has become a recruitment center after finding terrorist
recruitment videos and hearing that three British citizens are being held at the U.S.
detention center in Cuba).
93. See Cooper & Champion, supra note 5 (explaining the United Kingdom's
aversion to extradition requests from countries using the death penalty or torturous
punishments).
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public emergency that, "affects the whole population and constitutes

a threat to the organised life of the community of which the State is
composed." 95
2. Lawless Versus the Current Situation-the Reality of the Threat to
the United Kingdom
In examining the current situation under the Court of Human

Rights' holding in Lawless, critics assert that the current situation in
the United Kingdom fails to qualify as a public emergency requiring
a derogation from the Human Rights Convention because of the
differences in the circumstances.96 In Lawless and the United
Kingdom's previous uses of extraordinary measure to combat the

violence stemming from Northern Ireland, the terrorism actually
occurred in the country declaring the public emergency. 7 Parliament
enacted the Anti-terrorism Act, however, in response to an attack that

occurred in the United States, not in the United Kingdom." The
United Kingdom, however, believes that the attack on the United

94. See UK's Blunkett Say Anti-terrorist Bill Has 'Proportionate, Targeted
Measures,' supra note 20 (announcing that preventing abuse of terrorism and
asylum laws is a key component of the Anti-terrorism Act).
95. See Lawless, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 31 (defining public emergency under
Article 15(1) of the Human Rights Convention).
96. See Gibb, supra note 15 (reporting the claims of civil liberties groups that a
public emergency does not exist in the United Kingdom, therefore the derogation
is invalid and the detention of suspected international terrorists violates the Human
Rights Convention); see also infra notes 97-107 (noting the differences between
the previous uses of anti-terrorism legislation to address terrorism directly
attacking the United Kingdom and the current legislation that addresses the threat
of global terrorism).
97. See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 33-50 (detailing the violence caused by
IRA and Unionists in both Northern Ireland and other parts of the United Kingdom
resulting in the enactment of special powers legislation to combat the situation,
often requiring derogations from the Convention); see also LAURA K. DONOHUE,
COUNTER-TERRORIST LAW AND EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

207 (2001) (noting that Parliament enacted the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act
to deal with the IRA's bombing campaign in Great Britain).
98. See supra notes 3, 5 and accompanying texts (announcing that the United
Kingdom responded to the attacks in the United States, as most other countries did,
by reviewing and increasing the authority of the government to deal with the threat
of international terrorism).
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States was essentially an attack on the United Kingdom,"9 in part
because of it connections to the United States, which makes it a
potential target for future international terrorists.'
To support this conclusion, it is important to consider that
terrorism not only damages the location where the attack occurs, but
also the areas in which the terrorists plan and organize the attacks."'
The United Kingdom continues to find evidence that terrorist
planning and recruiting are taking place inside its borders." 2 As the
Lawless Court stated, terrorist activity within a country's borders that
jeopardizes relations with other countries helps support the finding
that a public emergency exists.103 The United Kingdom also has
reason to suspect that terrorist organizational activities taking place
within its borders will strain and harm relations with neighboring
countries and other allies based on the criticism that Britain has
become a terrorist haven.'01 Even though the attacks on September
11 occurred in the United States, the realities of international

99. See Tony" Blair's Speech, supra note 4 (declairing Tony Blair's belief that
this was not just an attack on America, but also an attack on the democracy and the
world).
100. See Nicholas Barry, The International Islamic Terrorist Network (noting
that bin Laden called upon his followers "to kill Americans and their allies, civilian
and military, as an individual duty"), at http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terroristnetwork.cfm (last visited Apr. 13, 2002); see also Cloud, supra note 78 (reporting
that although no direct evidence exists that additional attacks are planned, the next
attack would not likely occur in America because the United States is on high
alert).
101. See Lawless, I Eur. H.R. Rep. at 31-32 (finding of a public emergency
resulted from the secret nature of the terrorist organizations, the international
operation of the groups, and the inability to control the groups using traditional law
enforcement).
102. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text (detailing the popularity of
the United Kingdom with international terrorists, as well as the links other
countries have discovered between international terrorists and the United
Kingdom, leading to the United Kingdom's reputation as a "haven" for terrorists).
103. See Lawless, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 31 (declaring that IRA activity "outside
the territory of the State" could harm relations with neighboring countries).
104. See Investigating TerrorPlaces, supra note 21 (noting the criticism fiaing
the United Kingdom because of its popularity with international terrorists).
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terrorism have created a public emergency in the United Kingdom
5
that meets the standards established in Lawless.u
C. MEASURES TAKEN BY THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTY IN
DEROGATION ARE STRICTLY REQUIRED BY THE SITUATION

In Lawless, the Court examined Ireland's actions to make the
determination that the measures of Offences Act were "strictly
required by the emergency existing" at the time.106 In making the
determination that Ireland's actions were proportional, the Court
concluded that "the application of ordinary law had proved unable to
check the growing danger which threatened the Republic of
Ireland."' 17 In addition, the Court found that Ireland included many
safeguards in the Offences Act and its subsequent amendments to
prevent abuses of its emergency powers, further limiting the Irish
government's measures to those strictly required by the situation."os
The Irish Parliament supervised the application of the law by
receiving details of its enforcement.101 Ireland's Parliament also
possessed the authority to annul its proclamation that a public
emergency existed." 0 Finally, the Offences Act and amendments

105. See Lawless, I Eur. H.R. Rep. at 31 (defining public emergency as a
serious situation that affects the entire population and presents a threat to the life of
the State).
106. See id. at 32 (continuing the examination of the appropriateness of Ireland's
derogation from its obligations under the Convention).
107. See id. at 33 (stating that Ireland had attempted to control the situation
using traditional means, but had failed). Some members of the Commission had
suggested that Ireland had other means available before it took such extraordinary
measures. Id. at 32. Those dissenting members suggested the possibility of using
special criminal or military courts, which the Offences Act allowed, or sealing the
border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland to control the IRA.
Id. at 32-33. The Court found sealing the border an inappropriate response,
because it would have seriously affected the population as a whole, a result that
was beyond the scope required by the circumstances at the time. Id. at 33.
108. See Lawless, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 33 (describing the steps taken by the Irish
government to prevent abuses of the special powers available under the Offences
Act and its subsequent amendments).
109. See id. (listing the safeguards that the Court found important to the
proportionality of the measures used by Ireland).
110. See id. at 33 (mentioning an additional safeguard provided in the
legislation).
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provided the terms by which a person could end his own detention."
The Court found that the safeguards provided were of particular
importance to the determination that the measures were "strictly
2
required by the exigencies of the situation."" 1
D. APPLICATION OF LAWLESSTO THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT
Traditional law enforcement appears powerless to protect the
United Kingdom from the threat posed by suspected international
terrorists, thus requiring the extraordinary powers of the Antiterrorism Act." 3 The United Kingdom understands, from its long
history of dealing with the threatening nature of terrorism, that
terrorism deters many people from providing information and
prevents, or severely hinders, law enforcement officials' successful
use of ordinary methods.' If traditional law enforcement systems
cannot function properly, the safety of the entire nation is
threatened." 5
The United Kingdom often faces this problem when dealing with
the situation in Northern Ireland, which reinforces the belief that any
attempt to rely solely on ordinary legal measures will fail with regard
to the current terrorist threat." 6 Although terrorists rarely accomplish
111. See id. at 33-34 (explaining that the government would release a detainee if
he gave an undertaking to respect the law and refrain from illegal activities).
112. See id. at 34 (finding that Ireland's law permitting detention without a trial
was within the meaning of Article 15(1)).
113. See infra notes 114-120 and accompanying text (declaring that traditional
law enforcement generally has been ineffective in dealing with terrorism).
114. See Ireland,2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 37 (determining that traditional methods of
investigation and prosecution became inadequate in attempting to deal with IRA
terrorists in Northern Ireland, because widespread intimidation made it virtually
impossible for the government to obtain evidence). In Ireland, the Court of Human
Rights found that a public emergency existed in the United Kingdom, in part
because of the government's inability to curb the IRA terrorists' intimidation of
potential witnesses when it attempted to use traditional criminal trials. Id. at 43.
115. See Lawless, I Eur. H.R. Rep. at 37 (discussing how the IRA's terrorism
rendered ordinary law enforcement ineffective to maintain peace and order,
thereby causing imminent danger to the entire nation).
116. See id. at 33 (discussing the United Kingdom's lack of control over
terrorists groups in Northern Ireland due to the secrecy and fear created by such
groups, leading to the use of emergency powers); see also Ireland, 2 Eur. H-.R.
Rep. at 33-51 (detailing the conflict in Northern Ireland between the Catholic
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their ultimate goal of causing the government to collapse," 7 they
usually succeed in terrifying the citizenry into silence."' Also,
because of their traning, terrorists themselves often remain silent
during interrogations, preventing law enforcement officials from
learning about and stopping future acts of terrorism." 9 Terrorism
perpetuates a silence that renders typical law enforcement practices
powerless, requiring the use of extraordinary measures to combat the
20
terrorists' activities.'

Nationalists and the Protestant Loyalists and the ineffectiveness of ordinary legal
and political attempts to quell the violence, resulting ultimately in the use of
emergency powers on several occasions).
117. See Jacquard, supra note 87 (stating that terrorists attempt to traumatize the
citizenry in the hope that it will eventually cause the government to collapse).
While the goal of terrorism is unrealistic, its irrationality is directly in line with the
"madness driving bin Laden and his terrorist associates." See id.; see also Martha
Crenshaw, The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic
Choice, in

WOODROW

WILSON

CENTER

SERIES,

ORIGINS

OF TERRORISM:

PSYCHOLOGIES, IDEOLOGIES, THEOLOGIES, STATES OF MIND, 8 (Walter Reich ed.,

1992) (examining the idea that terrorism is based on collective preferences or
values, which lead those involved to choose violence because they believe it is the
most efficient way to achieve their collective goals). Generally, the terrorist "'nonstate" actors choose terrorism as a last resort because they feel helpless in
comparison to the superior size of the governments they oppose. Id. at 11.
Terrorism, therefore, becomes a weapon of last resort because the terrorists
perceive such an imbalance of power betveen themselves and the government that
they are trying to change or affect. Id.
118. See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 37, 43 (discussing law enforcement
officials' inability to obtain information from the public because of intimidation by
terrorist actors or sympathizers). Authorities were also unable to convince potential
witnesses that the government could protect them from IRA retaliation, impeding
the use of trials against those responsible for the terrorist activities in Northern
Ireland. Id.
119. See Brannigan v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 559 (1993)
(finding that special arrest and detention powers are often needed to combat
terrorism because of the difficulty in using ordinary law enforcement methods to
successfully gather and because of the terrorists' training to remain silent).
120. See Ireland,2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 44 (reporting that the Commission charged
with studying the problem in Northern Ireland found that "[the fear of
intimidation [was] widespread and well-founded," and until the government could
remove the fear, extraordinary means of law enforcement were necessary to
control the terrorists through detention); see also Brannigan, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. at
599 (finding that terrorists' silence during interrogation allows them to frustrate
law enforcement officials).
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The Anti-terrorism Act contains several safeguards that limit the
United Kingdom to those measures strictly required by the
exigencies of the circumstances. 12 Section 21 of the Anti-terrorism
Act requires the Secretary of State to provide both the person
certified and the reviewing court with a copy of the certificate. 22 A
person certified as a suspected international terrorist may appeal the
certification to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission
("SIAC"), which possesses the authority to cancel the certificate if it
finds a lack of "reasonable grounds for a belief or suspicion" of
terrorist activity.2 3 To further prevent abuse of the certification
process, the Anti-terrorism Act requires the SIAC to review all
certifications, regardless of whether the suspected international
terrorist appealed the certificate. 2 4 The Anti-terrorism Act also
mandates a review of, and sets an expiration date for, the sections

concerning the certification and detention of suspected international
terrorists.2 5 A committee, appointed by the Secretary of State, must

121. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, §§ 21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 122
(describing the different methods of review, appeal, and other safeguards in the
Anti-terrorism Act).
122. See id. § 21(6)(a)-(b) ("Where the Secretary of State issues a certificate
under subsection (1) he shall as soon as is reasonably practicable (a) take
reasonable steps to notify the person certified, and (b) send a copy of the certificate
to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.").
123. See id. § 25(1)-(2) (establishing a person's right to appeal the Secretary of'
State's certification labeling him as a suspected international terrorist). The
defendant must file an appeal within a period of three months from the issuance of
the certification, or by permission of the Commission after three months have
passed. Id. § 25(5)(a)-(b).
124. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, § 26 (requiring the SIAC
to hold a first review six months after the issuance of the certificate, or from the
final determination of appeal, and further review every three months thereafter). I
§ 26(1), (3). If the SIAC finds that the certificate lacks "reasonable grounds for a
belief or suspicion" of terrorist activity at the time of review, it must cancel the
certificate. Id. § 26(5)(a).
125. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, §§ 28, 29 (requiring a
person appointed by the Secretary of State to review sections 21-23, as well as
setting November 10, 2006 as an expiration date for those sections). The appointed
person must complete his review within fourteen months after the Anti-terrorist
Act enters into effect. Id. § 28(2)(a). Both the Parliament and the Secretary of State
must receive the review. Id. § 28(3),(4). Section 29 establishes several expiration
periods for sections 21-23, while also allowing the Parliament or Secretary of State
to renew those sections for emergency purposes. Id. § 29(1)-(6). However, section
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review the entire Anti-terrorism Act after two years.' 26 The final
safeguard against abuse is the guarantee that the United Kingdom
will release those people detained under the Anti-terrorism Act if
they promise to leave the country. 127
The Court has warned member countries not to adopt measures
that will destroy democracy in the effort to fight terrorism.,, Based
on its previous experiences with terrorism, the United Kingdom has
determined that the extraordinary detention powers of the Antiterrorism Act provide the only means to protect the nation from the
threat of suspected international terrorism.' 2 9 The United Kingdom
understands the Court's caution to protect democracy and civil
liberties, but also understands that without these extraordinary
powers of detention, the United Kingdom has no way of protecting
the population from suspected international terrorists.'30

29 firmly sets November 10, 2006 as the date on which sections 21-23 shall "'cease
to have effect," and allows no further renewals of those sections. Id. § 29(7).
126. See id. § 122 (articulating further safeguards that require a committee to
review the entire Anti-terrorism Act, and present a report to the Secretary of State
and the Parliament).
127. See Ben Taylor & Tania Shankinovsky, Eight Hel in Raids on Terrorism
Suspects, DAILY MAIL (LONDON), Dec. 20, 2001, at 2 (maintaining that the United
Kingdom could indefinitely detain the persons arrested in the first use of the Antiterrorism Act unless they choose to leave the country), available at 2001 WL
31776801.
128. See Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214, 232
(1978) (announcing that the Court limits the discretion afforded to member
countries in their adoption of anti-terrorism policies, because of the danger that
unlimited discretion can lead to laws which destroy democracy in the name of
defending it). But see Ronald St. J. Macdonald, Derogations Under Article 15 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225,
237-38 (noting that the Court recognizes terrorism as a paramount threat to the
safety of a nation that requires the Court grant some latitude to member states to
enable them to safely and effectively handle terrorism).
129. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the previous
attempts and failures of using ordinary law enforcement to protect the nation from
terrorism).
130. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (detailing that before the
enactment of section 23 of the Anti-terrorism Act, the government had no way of
preventing suspected international terrorists from using the United Kingdom as a
safe haven).
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The United Kingdom has a long history of using emergency
powers.' Starting in colonial times and continuing throughout its
dealings today with Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom often
found it necessary to use emergency powers to resolve difficult
situations.'
The Convention intended that the use of emergency
powers and derogations under Article 15 would be limited only to
the extent required by the situation.' Following the introduction and
the passage of the Anti-terrorism Act, the government stressed that
the measures taken were a proportional response to the threat of
global terrorism. 3 4 In order to show continued respect for human

131. See DONOHUE, supra note 97, at 306-07 (discussing the United Kingdom's
repeated use of emergency powers to control the situation in Northern Ireland). See
generally A.W.B. Simpson, Round Up the Usual Suspects: The Legacy of British
Colonialism and the European Convention on Human Rights, 41 LoY. L. RI.V.
629, 633-82 (1996) (exploring the different methods the United Kingdom has used
to suspend habeas corpus). Originally, the United Kingdom used martial law in
colonial South Africa between 1899 and 1902 to suspend habeas corpus during the
war-like conditions of the time. Id. at 635. The United Kingdom then experimented
in Western African countries by combining detentions with exile. See id. at 63637. To deal with the unrest in Ireland in the early nineteenth century, the United
Kingdom began enacting emergency codes to permit administrative detentions,
because it believed that jury trials would be ineffective. Id. at 638. The United
Kingdom frequently enacted emergency detention legislation, particularly to
control the situation in Northern Ireland, but also in other parts of the United
Kingdom during World War I and World War II. Id. at 639-46, 651-55, 679-82.
132. See Simpson, supra note 131, at 633-82 (chronicling the United Kingdom's
long practice of using emergency codes to allow for administrative detentions).
133. See Convention, supra note 16, art. 15(1) (requiring that the member
country limit the measures taken in derogation of the Convention to those strictly
required by the scope of the emergency). Article 15 requires the member country
to keep the Secretary General informed of the measures taken and the reasons for
those measures. Id. art. 15(3). The member country must also notify the Secretary
General when the public emergency no longer exists and country is again fulfilling
its obligations under the Convention. Id.
134. See Blunkett Defends Anti-Terrorism Powers, TIMF.'S (LONDON), Nov. 19,

2001 (on file with author) (labeling the proposed anti-terrorism powers a
proportional response to the threats to national security); Johnson, supra note 13,
(noting that moderate precautions were needed in the United Kingdom's legal
system "for dealing with the terrorists rewriting their rulebook"); UK's Blunketi
Says Anti-Terrorist Bill Has 'Proportionate,Targeted Measures', supra note 20
(announcing that the Anti-terrorism Act is the proportionate response needed to
protect the United Kingdom's way of life from terrorists).

2002]

ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT

2001

1291

rights and due process, the United Kingdom should continually
review the necessity of the emergency powers provided by the Antiterrorism Act and ensure that the derogation is in fact only
temporary.'35
A. REVIEW OF THE LAW: THE CONTINUED NECESSITY OF THE
ANTI-TERRORISM ACT
1. Required Review Process of the A nti-terrorismAct
The Anti-terrorism Act requires review of the sections concerning
detention of suspected international terrorists, 3 6 as well as review of
the entire Act.'37 The Act provides specific details that the
government must follow in the review process, including the number
of people to conduct the review, the timing of the review, and the
presentation of a report on the review to both the Secretary of State
and the Parliament.'38 Additionally, the Anti-terrorism Act limits the
Secretary of State's power to certify and detain suspected
international terrorists by setting November 10, 2006 as the
expiration date for sections 21 through 23.1 9 These provisions help
ensure that the measures the British government takes in response to
the public emergency are strictly tailored to the circumstances of the

135. See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Fortification of an Emergency Regime, 59

ALB. L. REv. 1353, 1359 (1996) (finding that due process rights are often
neglected and limited under emergency regimes); see also Emanuel Gross, supra
note 87, at 91 (discussing that in fighting terrorism, liberal democracies face the
unique challenge of maintaining the nation's security without destroying
democracy).
136. See Anti-terrorism. Crime and Security Act 2001, § 28(1) (requiring the
Secretary of State to appoint a person to review sections 21 through 23 of the Act).
137. See id. § 122(1) (mandating that the Secretary of State appoint a committee
to review the Act as a whole).
138. See id. §§ 28, 122 (describing the details and requirements of the separate
mandatory reviews required for sections 21 through 23 and the entire Act).
139. See id. § 29(7) (declaring that sections 21 through 23, which give the
Secretary of State the power to label individuals as suspected terrorists and to
detain individuals even when removal from the United Kingdom is not practical,
shall expire at the end of November 10, 2006).
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emergency. 40 The United Kingdom's past failures in reviewing
temporary and emergency powers raise concerns regarding the limits
of the Anti-terrorism Act, thus the government must strictly follow
the provisions to prevent abuses of human rights and the violation of
4
the Convention.' '
2. The United Kingdom's PreviousAttempts at Reviewing the
Necessity of Emergency Powers
In response to internal and international pressure in the 1970s, the
United Kingdom began limiting the scope of its emergency
legislation in an attempt to prevent violations of human rights." 2
Therefore, part of the emergency powers enacted for Northern
Ireland in 1973 called for the ongoing reviews of the terms of the
emergency regimes. 4 However, reviews of both the Northern
Ireland (Emergency Provision) Act ("EPA") and the Prevention of
Terrorism Act ("PTA") resulted in the expansion of the respective

laws.

44

In 1995, Parliament renewed the EPA and PTA in spite of a sixmonth long cease-fire in Northern Ireland.' 4 5 Parliament based that
renewal on a review that used data collected before the six-month

140. See supra, notes

121-126

and

accompanying

text

(explaining

the

safeguards written into the Anti-terrorism Act that limit the measures available to
the government when dealing with a public emergency).
141. See infra notes 143-148 and accompanying text (describing the United
Kingdom's past failures to protect human rights when acting under limited
emergency powers).
142. See DONOHUE, supra note 97, at 340-41 (describing the balance that tile
British government sought between preventing terrorism from harming the
population while also ensuring that the laws did not subvert democracy).
143. See Aolain, supra note 135, at 1371 (noting the creation of indepcndcnt
reviews of the emergency powers enacted to control the situation in Northern
Ireland).
144. See id. at 1371-72 (discussing the expansions of the Acts as a result of the
reviews in 1987).
145. See id. at 1372 (stating that the review in 1995 resulting a recommended
continuation of the emergency powers despite the cease-fire that was in effect at
the time).

2002]

ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001

1293

long cease-fire. 4 6 Officials insisted that the cease-fire did not halt the
training activities of the terrorist groups in Northern Ireland,' 47 even
though authorities significantly decreased the use of emergency laws
during this period. 48 The validity of the government's claim of the
continued threat to the security of the nation becomes questionable
when the government does not use the very means designed to
eliminate that threat.

49

B. THE UNITED KINGDOM MUST ENSURE THAT THE DEROGATION
REMAINS A TEMPORARY MEASURE

A major part of the debate in Parliament concerning the Antiterrorism Act was that the detention of suspected international
terrorists must remain a temporary measure. 50 The debate resulted in
a sunset clause in section 29, causing the detention powers to expire
on November 10, 2006. "1While the expiration date sets an important
limitation on the extraordinary powers to detain suspected
international terrorists, Parliament can renew the detention powers
through further legislation. 5 2 Allowing the detention powers to
expire when the emergency situation ends is necessary not only to

146. See id. (asserting that although the officials presented their review after the
cease-fire, they collected the data prior to the cease-fire).
147. See id. at 1366-67 (explaining officials' belief that the public emergency
continued after the cease-fire because terrorist training continued).
148. See Aolain, supra note 135, at 1369 (noting the decrease in the use of the
emergency powers during the Northern Ireland cease-fire).
149. See id. at 1370 (addressing apparent contradiction of the United Kingdom
in claiming the situation in Northern Ireland still required the existence, but not the
use of, the emergency powers).
150. See Hurst, supra note 82 (reporting that the concession of a five-year sunset
clause was necessary to prevent the demise of the Anti-terrorism Bill during
Parliamentary debate). The lifespan of sections 21-23 now matches the duration of
the derogation from the Human Rights Conventions. Id.
151. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. § 29 (stating that sections
21 through 23 will expire on the date specified in section 29).
152. See Hurst, supra note 82 (noting that the detention power of the Antiterrorism Act will expire in November 2006, but new legislation can extend these
powers).
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the protection of the right of due process, 5 3 but also for maintaining
the validity of the derogation under Article 15 of the Convention. 54
In addition to a long history of using temporary emergency
powers, the United Kingdom has also continually renewed the
temporary acts, ignoring the limitations on derogations under Article
15(1).155 In 1922, the Northern Ireland government passed a
temporary special powers act that essentially allowed for the
continuation of two previous acts; by 1933, the Northern Irish
Parliament made the act indefinite.'56 Despite the fact that Parliament
limited the 1973 Emergency Powers Act to two years, the Act
remained in existence for twenty-seven years through a series of
extensions and renewals.'
Parliament has often repeated this
process of proclaiming an act to be a temporary measure to deal with
a specific emergency, only to either extend the act or reenact
virtually identical legislation under a different name. I
153. See Emanuel Gross, supra note 87, at 162 (articulating that the preservation
of due process rights through the ordinary criminal process presents the best
method for dealing with internal threats). Emanuel Gross asserts two reasons why
the United Kingdom should use criminal law. Id. First, the resulting appearance of
normalcy demonstrates symbolically that the government can overcome the
problem using the ordinary legal system. It. Second, the ordinary criminal
procedure carries a greater legitimacy than does the use of extraordinary powers.
See id.; see also DONOHUE, supra note 97, at xix (arguing that emergency
measures provide short-term benefits, but in the long-term, the measures can
eliminate confidence in the government's ability to address terrorism).
154. See Convention, supra note 16, art. 15(1) (allowing extraordinary measures
contrary to the Convention only to the extent required by the situation).
155. See DONOHUE, supra note 97, at 353 (concluding that the emergency
powers enacted to resolve Northern Ireland's terrorism problems were not
temporary because they were continually renewed); Emanuel Gross, supra note 87,
at 148 (noting that the United Kingdom renews most of its anti-terrorism or
rewrites them into new legislation); see also Convention, supra note 16, art. 15( 1)
(stating that the second requirement of derogation is that the measures taken in
derogation from the obligations of the Convention may only be those that are
strictly required by the circumstances of the emergency).
156. See DONOHUE, supra note 97, at 306 (discussing the early instances where
the United Kingdom made temporary laws permanent).
157. See id. at 306 (noting the series of the British Parliament's extensions of the
1973 Emergency Powers Act, which was proclaimed to be a temporary act limited
to the emergency situation in Northern Ireland).
158. See id. at 306-07 (detailing the British Parliament's practice of extending
temporary measures beyond the time frame originally set forth in the acts).
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The public played an important role in many of the previous
extensions of termporary legislation, because the legislation only
applied to a small portion of the population. 5 9 The public did not call
for the repeal of the legislation, because it only affected terrorists
who were attacking the democracy.' 6° The Parliament hesitated even
at the suggestion of repealing previous anti-terrorism legislation to
avoid the appearance that the government had yielded to the
6
demands of the terrorists.' '
Pressure from several sources will help to ensure that the United
Kingdom's derogation from the Convention and the extraordinary
powers of detention remain temporary. Although the public supports
the Anti-terrorism Act and abhors the acts of violence committed in
the United States on September 11, the public has voiced its concern
for the protection of basic civil liberties. 62 Members of Parliament
also expressed their concerns regarding the indefinite detention of
suspected international terrorists through the establishment of the
expiration date in section 29 of the Anti-terrorism Act.' 6 Additional
pressure from the international community, particularly the Council
of Europe may help decrease the United Kingdom's temptation to
extend the temporary powers of the Anti-terrorism Act beyond their
expiration date. 164

159. See id. at 310 (noting that the British public remained largely unconcerned
by the extension of previous temporary measures because the measures only
affected a small portion of the population).
160. See id. at 316 (explaining the public's view that the only people affected by
the continuous extension of the previous temporary measures were the terrorists).
161. See id. 317 (asserting that the United Kingdom was slow in repealing
temporary measures to demonstrate that the government would not tolerate
terrorism).
162. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing British citizens
high regard for civil liberties and the fear of the powers of the detention under the
Anti-terrorism Act); see also, Oren Gross, supra note 54, at 460, 463 (asserting
that the Court of Human Rights is overly deferential to the decisions of the
member countries and rarely challenges a member country's conclusions regarding
the existence of a public emergency).
163. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting the Parliamentarian
pressures placed on the government during the Anti-terrorism Act debate to limit
the duration of the detention powers).
164. See Macdonald, supra note 128, at 239 (proposing that the Court of Human
Rights and the Council of Europe subject emergency measures to continuing
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CONCLUSION
International terrorists executed a complex and devistating attack
on September 11, 2001, and in response, the United Kingdom
enacted extraordinary legislation aimed at preventing such action
from occurring again. 65 Although the Anti-terrorism Act deprives
suspected international terrorists of civil liberties, the United
Kingdom has concluded that suspected international terrorists are
such a threat to the nation extraordinary legislation is required. 6,The
Human Rights Convention allows member countries to use
extraordinary measures that would otherwise violate the Convention,
during times of public emergency so member countries can properly
67
protect their citizens.1

The United Kingdom reasonably believes that it faces a public
emergency that threatens the life of the nation. 6 While the Court of
Human Rights will likely side with the United Kingdom, declaring
Britain's derogation valid, the United Kingdom must ensure that it

supervision to guarantee that the circumstances causing the derogation are still
present); Council of Europe Secretary General Advocates Proportionality and
Balance of Anti-terrorist Measures (announcing that the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe had received the United Kingdom's notice of derogation from
Article 5 of the Convention, but heavily stressed that democracies should not allow
terrorism to destroy the rule of law), at http://press.coe.int/cp/2001/983a(2001 ).hm
(last visited June 28, 2002). But see Oren Gross, supra note 54, at 463 (arguing
that although the Court of Human Rights professes to critically review a country's
decision to derogate, the Court hesitates to interfere in the member states'
decisions to declare a state of emergency).
165. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (noting that the attacks on
September 11 prompted the enactment of the United Kingdom's Anti-terrorism
Act).
166. See supra notes 69-95, 113-130 and accompanying text (detailing the
current situation in the United Kingdom that has led the British government to
determine that a public emergency exists).
167. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (explaining that while the
protection of civil liberties is important, member countries must also consider the
safety and protection of their citizens).
168. See supra notes 75-95 and accompanying text (explaining why the British
government currently believes that a public emergency exists in the United
Kingdom).
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does not permanently suspend civil liberties." 9 The British public
and the Court of Human rights may approve of the curtailment of
civil liberties as a short-term emergency response, but neither group
wishes to allow terrorism to result in the permanent destruction of
17
civil liberties. 1

169. See supra notes 131-164 and accompanying text (explaining the
importance of limiting the emergency powers of the Anti-terrorism Act in both
duration and scope).
170. See supra notes 81-82, 128, 164 and accompanying texts (stressing the
importance of ensuring that responses to terrorism are proportional and do not
destroy democracy).

